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Revisiting Business Methods: Should They Remain Patentable? 
I. Introduction:  
Business Methods (hereinafter BMs) are patentable due to the controversial State Street 
decision.  State Street and subsequent cases did not address the practical and policy perspectives 
that are relevant in considering the decision to grant BMs as a patentable category.  This is still 
open for debate, as the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the patentability of BMs nor 
software.  This is important because precedent has broadened the category of patentable BMs by 
creating a minimum abstract idea standard.  Additionally, The U.S. Patent Office has continued 
to issue business method patents (hereinafter bmPs) that could probably be considered abstract 
ideas, and has been churning out bmPs at an alarmingly high rate.  Congressional response has 
been limited, and parties might still be forced to challenge the validity of bmPs with substantially 
high litigation costs.  Since bmPs enjoy a presumption of validity, challengers have the burden of 
production and proof.  In this paper, I am suggesting that BMs, or methods of doing business, 
should at least be re-examined from a practical and policy perspective.  I conclude with two 
recommendations.  The broader recommendation is that BMs should not be considered 
patentable.  The narrower recommendation is that BMs should require patent applicants to prove 
both patentability and novelty, based on a presumption against both. 
Part II discusses BMs as a patentable subject category based on court precedent and 
defines BMs as used in this paper.  Part II A discusses the expansion of the patentable categories 
to include BMs as a type of process by court precedent.  State Street held BMs are categorically 
patentable as a type of process.  Software and financial calculations can “transform” numbers 
into a useful, tangible result to satisfy the MOT Test.  The Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. 
Kappos held that abstract ideas can never be patented, and a BM embodies an abstract idea if it is 
a well known industrial practice, despite a particular application to a specific economic market.  
Practically speaking, the Bilski decision did not limit the scope of patentable BMs.  The decision 
itself is questionable, since at least four Justices concurred that methods of doing business should 
not be patentable.  Supreme Court precedent had already held abstract ideas to are not patentable, 
since they embody the very ideas needed to innovate.  Even the non-determinative MOT Test is 
extremely broad.  Patent examiners face real difficulties in spotting abstract ideas because there 
is no bright line rule.   
Part II B defines BMs and discusses some real world examples of issued bmPs.  When 
discussing BMs, we are concerned about methods that are claimed in bmPs, and where the 
invention is mainly a commercial strategy.  Software bmPs are included. Of particular relevance 
is “Class 705” patents, which consist of methods for performing data processing or calculations.  
These include functions directed towards managing a corporation or price calculation.  Some 
notable bmPs are discussed because they likely are abstract ideas, yet still are covered by patent. 
Examples include patents for the method of “upselling” in a restaurant, a method for promoting 
mattress sales, and even a method describing the common real estate industry method of flipping 
indebted property and the required formulas.  These are a tribute to the central notion of the 
paper that BMs should not be patentable because there is the potential for abstract ideas to issue 
as patents, which should never be patentable. 
Part III discusses the real threats that bmPs present to the patent system.  Part III A 
discussed issues presented in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter USPTO) practice, 
the official regulatory agency of the patent system.  The USPTO could probably continue to 
grant low quality bmPs similar to the examples discussed in Part II because it has been steadfast 
in its prosecution procedure that remains substantially unaffected by Bilski.  USPTO statistics 
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from the past two years indicate increased applications for Class 705 BMs, and a rate of issuing 
patents that has nearly quadrupled compared to previous years. The USPTO continues to face a 
backlogged system, since it takes about three years to grant a patent.  Additionally, the 
application system encourages broad claims and patent examiners might have difficulty 
researching prior art.  Part III B considers Congressional consideration of BMs.  The America 
Invents Act did not change patentable subject categories.  Congress has provided a limited 
defense available to those who have used BMs in commerce, as well as some other remedies 
discussed in Part III C.  Part III C discusses the difficulties faced in challenging bmPs that have 
already been issued.  Issued patents are presumed valid, so the burden is on the challenger to 
prove invalidity.  Congress has provided a post-issuance remedy within the USPTO that might 
alleviate some major litigation costs, but it probably is not enough because discovery alone often 
costs hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
Part IV discusses the policy rationale of patent law.  The ultimate goal is to promote 
innovation with a patent incentive.  This is important in industries requiring high investments in 
order to innovate and where inventions are easily copied by “free-riders.”  But BMs generally do 
not require direct investment costs because they often flow naturally from normal business or are 
a byproduct of the business need to create sustainable competitive advantages.  Even if BMs do 
require investment costs, these are generally low compared to other inventions, since BMs do not 
require costs which are typical to physical inventions, such as producing physical prototypes.  
BMs are not easily copied by free-riders because despite being practiced in public, they are non-
informing uses.  Free-riders cannot figure out the precise steps of a method from only viewing 
the end result.  Software implemented BMs can also be protected by Federal and State laws.  
Even if a BM was easy to copy, the value of a BM is not easily replicated because the value is in 
the organizational implementation.  If a market provides incentives that can spur innovation 
without patent rights, the patent as an incentive rationale is weakened because other incentives 
can substitute as an incentive. BMs target achieving commercial gains, thus there is always a 
need to innovate better BMs.   
Part IV also addresses the costs society incurs as a result of granting bmPs.  Patents by 
their nature have anti-competitive effects, these are most alarming with bmPs because they can 
be the basis for an unfair advantage if they should be invalid.  Society also suffers because 
negotiation failures associated with licensing bmPs will lead to costly and resource consuming 
litigation, tying up the court system and forcing courts to get involved in what are essentially 
failed bargaining tactics.  eBay v. MercExchange is discussed as an excellent example of this 
concern.  
Finally, Part V concludes with two recommendations.  The first is broad: the requirement 
of patentable subject matter should perform a gatekeeper role for BMs and should categorically 
preclude them from patent.  The traditional policy concerns of patent law do not justify granting 
this monopoly. By precluding the patentability of BMs under the current patent system, it might 
force Congress to evaluate the policy concerns and potentially create a sui generis system for 
protecting patents.  The second recommendation is narrower, and proposes a rebuttable 
presumption that BMs are not patentable and are not novel, unless the patent applicant proves 
otherwise in the USPTO.   
II. Business Methods are Patentable: Court Rules, and Defining Business Methods 
A. Current Court Rules on the Patentability of Business Methods;  
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A patent grants the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed 
invention, but the Patent Act limits patentable inventions to certain categories.
1
  An inventor 
receives patent rights for the “claimed” invention in the patent application.2  Claims contain 
“limitations” describing the components of the invention, which in turn define the scope of the 
right to exclude others.
3
  To meet the threshold requirement for patentability, an invention must 
fall within a patentable subject category.  There is no explicit definition of a BM in the Patent 
Act.  Nonetheless, Courts have determined that BMs are a patentable process.
4
  The courts 
broadly interpret statutorily defined categories in light of Congressional intent to cover new and 
unprecedented technology.
5
  In fact, the patentable categories have routinely been expanded by 
courts in light of technological advancements, and most man-made inventions are patentable.
6
   
Federal Circuit Courts have used a “machine or transformation test” (MOT Test) in 
analyzing a process or method as patentable subject matter.  The MOT Test generally requires a 
method or process to either: (a) be applied for use in an overall process (i.e. where the abstract 
idea is not specifically claimed, but rather a component of the overall process)
7
 or (b) the method 
must transform an article into a different state or thing.
8
  The MOT Test is particularly useful in 
determining the patentability of methods which employ a math equation, law of nature, or an 
abstract idea; because if it passes the MOT Test the claimed method likely is patentable.   
In the groundbreaking State Street v. Signature Financial decision, the court held that 
both BMs and software are not categorically excluded from patent.
9
  The State Street BM, 
dubbed “Hub and Spoke,” used software to manage individual mutual funds (the “spokes”) by 
calculating their real time value based on the total worth of the central “hub.”10  The second 
prong of the MOT Test was satisfied because the system applied math formulas to raw data input 
of dollars and cents which “transformed” it into fixed share prices.11  Thus, the MOT Test is 
broad because a BM can be considered transformative by simply applying mathematical 
formulas to raw data input which transforms the information for a new use. 
                                                          
1
 E.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 100 - 329 (2012).  
2
 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) (explaining that in an infringement 
analysis, courts construe claims to determine if an alleged infringer has made, used, or sold the patented invention).  
3
 Id.  
4
 E.g., 35 U.S.C.§ 101 (2012) (defining process as a patentable category); and 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012) (“The term 
‘process’ means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or material.”). 
5
 See, e.g., J.E.M Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135 (2001) (holding that developed 
plant breeds are patentable subject category despite being an unforeseeable technological advancement because “§ 
101 ... is a dynamic provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions.”). 
6
 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3248 (2010) (discussing that anything man made is generally 
patentable, but subject to fulfillment of the other patentability requirements in the Patent Act).  
7
 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (holding that a process for curing synthetic rubber is a patentable 
process even though the method used a mathematical equation, it was only one part of a complex process and the 
patent did not claim the exclusive rights to the equation). 
8
 See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3225.  
9
 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
10
 See State Street Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1370. 
11
 Id. at 1373 (“[T]he transformation of data ... constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, 
formula, or calculation, because it produces ‘a useful, concrete and tangible result’- a final share price momentarily 
fixed for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in 
subsequent trades.”). 
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Bilski v. Kappos is the most recent Supreme Court decision exploring Business 
Methods.
12
  It narrowly held the MOT Test as neither exclusive nor determinative, so a BM can 
still be patentable even if it does not pass the MOT Test.
13
 In Bilski, a hedge fund management 
BM was not patentable because it was an embodiment of an abstract idea – the patent applicant 
claimed the rights to the concept of hedging risk as applied to energy markets.
14
  The BM 
explained how buyers and sellers of commodities in the energy market could hedge against price 
risk by “initiating a series of transactions” between themselves at a fixed rate based on historical 
averages.
15
  This method of hedging risk by purchasing at fixed prices is a generally known 
concept in economics, and the applicant was denied patent because an abstract idea does not 
become patentable when it is limited to a specific market context.
16
  Practically speaking, Bilski 
did not limit the scope of patentable BMs, but it may have expanded their patentability.  Since 
the MOT Test is no longer exclusive, courts and the USPTO could arguably use an abstract idea 
determination as the lowest threshold of patentability for BMs.  As discussed later, the USPTO 
has not substantially changed its analysis of BM patent applications in response to Bilski.
17
 
The laws of nature, natural phenomenon, math formulas, and abstract ideas
18
 have been 
excluded from patentability because these are the building blocks of the inventive process, the 
basic ideas required to innovate.
19
  For example, Newton’s discovery of gravity and Einstein’s 
theory of relativity are not patentable.
20
  For BMs, abstract ideas should exclude from 
patentability those common economic principles or strategies that are required to compete, like 
the method for managing and detecting risk held to be unpatentable in Bilski.   
In the context of Patent Office examination of a patent, the abstract idea concept presents 
special difficulties for patent examiners.  Some abstract ideas might slip through the cracks 
during examination and become patented.
21
  First, the nature of the concept cannot be 
specifically defined,
22
 but it is important in determining whether a BM is patentable as the lowest 
threshold of patentability.  Further, patent examiners are generally scientists and engineers, but 
neither economists nor business finance majors, so examiners may not be well educated to detect 
common economic or industry practices.
23
  However, the USPTO has acknowledged this fact 
and has extensively trained examiners to make them better suited for this task, but whether or not 
it has been enough to deal with the growing concern of bmPs is still up for debate.
24
  The 
                                                          
12
 See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. 3218. 
13
 Id. at 3221. 
14
 Id. at 3229.  
15
 Id. at 3224. 
16
 Id. at 3222.   
17
 See infra, Part III.A. 
18
 Hereinafter collectively referred to as abstract ideas or an abstract idea. 
19
 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972) (“[T]hey are the basic tools of scientific and technological 
work.”) (denying patent for software implemented method of converting binary-coded-decimals into pure binary 
numbers because claimed mathematical formula); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (holding not patentable a 
method for determining alarm limits because claims were over a mathematical formula, and post solution activity 
does not make a formula patentable). 
20
 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), quoted in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) 
21
 See infra, Part II.B. (showing that this has been true when we look at bmPs that have been recently issued). 
22
 But cf. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. 65 (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852)) (“A principle, in the 
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented...”). 
23
 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT EXAMINER POSITIONS, QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS  
(Nov. 16, 2003), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/exam.htm#req (requiring generally undergraduate degrees in 
science or engineering). 
24
 See infra, Part III.A. 
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USPTO and courts still are faced with the difficult task to determine whether BMs are really the 
embodiment of abstract ideas.  
As mentioned, courts have expanded the definitions of patentable categories to cover new 
technology, but bmPs raise particular concerns.  First, the Supreme Court has never specifically 
ruled on whether or not BMs are a patentable subject category, and has stated that bmPs are of 
“suspect validity.”25  In Bilski itself, four Supreme Court Justices sided with Justice Stevens’ 
concurring opinion that BMs should not be patentable at all.
26
  Additionally, few, if any, 
empirical studies have been examined by Congress and the underlying policy concerns of the 
patent system overall have not been balanced.
27
  As Professor Dreyfuss mentions, it seems as if 
once a new technology is created, it is assumed that someone should have the right to capture 
that value through the expansion of intellectual property laws.
28
  This assumption is 
inappropriate because it disregards the underlying policies of patent law.
29
  A careful balancing 
of the rights of the individual inventor against the rights of society in general should be 
required.
30
  Admittedly, many courts in dicta have expressed a preference that BMs be analyzed 
under the additional requirements of the Patent Act, like novelty, non-obviousness and utility.
31
  
However, whether BMs are a patentable category is a threshold analysis that has remained 
incomplete from both a practical and policy standpoint.   
B. Defining Business Methods: Some Examples. 
Generally stated as broadly as possible, Business Methods (BMs) are processes (i.e. a 
series of steps) that are mainly a commercial or market-based strategy.
32
  They describe the 
methods of doing business.  A bmP claims the patent rights over a BM, and are typically Class 
705 filings within the USPTO, which includes software applications.
33
  BmPs generally seek to 
accomplish one of two commercial goals achieved through improving financial techniques: 
reducing transaction costs or increasing productivity levels.
34
  Note that bmPs utilizing computer 
software are generally included in this definition. 
For both comparison and purposes of this paper, BMs do not include those processes that 
are applied to physical objects or used as part of a physical machine, with the exception of 
                                                          
25
 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010) (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExch., L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
26
 Id. at 3231 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The wiser course would have been to hold that petitioners' method is not a 
“process” because it describes only a general method of engaging in business transactions—and business methods 
are not patentable. More precisely, although a process is not patent-ineligible simply because it is useful for 
conducting business, a claim that merely describes a method of doing business does not qualify as a ‘process’ ...”). 
27
 BRONWYN H. HALL, BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS, INNOVATION, AND POLICY 9 (2003) [hereinafter HALL, 
BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS] (summarizing much of the research on bmPs and scholar’s view on the subject). 
28
 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 274 (2000) (explaining that intellectual property rights are basically viewed as solutions to the 
free rider problem, and are valued because they encourage disclosure to the public). 
29
 Id. at 11 (explaining the thought that property rights should be recognized when there is a public benefit as 
opposed to simply a private benefit).  See generally JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
PRINCIPLES §§ 2 – 3 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court has often analyzed policy concerns when 
discussing a new category of patentable subject matter). 
30
 See infra Part IV.  
31
 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
32
 Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common Sense, Congressional 
Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 69 (2002). 
33
 See infra, p. 10. 
34
 Keith E. Maskus & Eina Vivian Wong, Searching for Economic Balance in Business Method Patents, 8 WASH. U. 
J. L. & POL’Y 289, 297 (2002) [hereinafter Maskus and Wong]. 
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computers.  BMs are distinguished from physically embodied inventions because these generally 
do not serve completely commercial functions and there is often a tangible result which can be 
held in your hands.
35
  Additionally, BMs are distinguishable from physical inventions because 
bmPs claim patent rights over a method for actually doing business, while physical inventions 
claim the physical embodiment of the invention.  Physical inventions are not purely methods of 
doing business.  Thus, those processes which satisfy the MOT Test are not BMs at issue here.
36
 
The very nature of BMs permits them to be broadly generalized, so they can be applied to 
many different types of industries or implementation methods.
37
  This is because many 
organizations seek to reduce transaction costs and improve financial techniques by any means 
possible.  Many current bmPs are for generally well known BMs, but the claimed “inventive” 
method merely applies that BM to a new market or technology, particularly computer software 
or the internet.
38
  Some of the most notable examples are those that occur at the point of sale to a 
customer.  One example of a bmP covers a software method for “upselling” at a cash register of 
a food restaurant.
39
  If a customer purchases food with cash, the register calculates the change.  
The patented software cross checks the amount of change due with a defined virtual pool of 
additional food items that can be offered for that amount of change, and then gives customers the 
option to forego change for that food item.
40
  This practice of upselling is the embodiment of a 
rather simple abstract idea since it is one of the most common restaurant industry practices.
41
  
However, this bmP grants the exclusive right to preclude other software implementations of this 
generally well known concept of upselling.  Another example of a bmP is for a “method of 
promoting sleep systems,” describing how a salesperson can help a customer select the perfect 
mattress by positioning the customer on the bed with a certain arrangement of pillows.
42
  Both of 
the above are perfect examples of what should be considered unpatentable abstract ideas, yet 
they are covered by bmPs.  Applying generally known BMs to a specific market context should 
not create patentability.  Simply attaching a known BM to computer software should not make an 
abstract idea patentable either, as in the case of the upselling bmP noted above.  This was 
precisely the issue that the Supreme Court addressed in Bilski.
43
  
Many bmPs are formula based and are grouped in Class 705 within the USPTO.
44
  The 
BM groupings in Class 705 pertain to “general business operations,” and generally apply 
formulas to produce an output which is relevant to either an economic market or to business 
                                                          
35
 Id.  
36
 See supra, Part II.A (discussing the MOT Test). 
37
 See Maskus and Wong, supra note 34, at 299. 
38
 See Maskus and Wong, supra note 34. 
39
 Method and Sys. for Processing Supplementary Product Sales at a Point of Sale Terminal, U.S. Patent No. 
6,598,024 (filed Nov. 12, 1999) (issued July 22, 2003). 
40
 Id. at col. 14 l. 1(claim 1 recites: “A computer implemented method comprising: generating a purchase price of a 
purchase; generating a rounded price; calculating a round-up amount, the round-up amount being a difference 
between the purchase price and the rounded price; determining an upsell in dependence on the round-up amount; 
and outputting a signal indicative of the upsell.”). 
41
 I speak from my 12 years of experience as a waiter and the food industry in general. 
42
 U.S. Patent No. 6,997,070 (filed May 12, 2003) (issued Feb. 14, 2006).  
43
 See supra, Part II.A. 
44
 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, A USPTO WHITE PAPER: AUTOMATED FIN. OR MGMT. DATA PROCESSING 
METHODS (BUSINESS METHODS) (2009) [hereinafter USPTO WHITE PAPER], 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/whitepaper.pdf . 
7 
functions that are related to managing a corporation or calculating prices.
45
  Note how these 
types of formulas might satisfy the MOT Test as applied in State Street, because applying 
calculations to raw data input “transforms” them to useful and tangible results.46  The “Hub and 
Spoke” system at issue in State Street is but one example of a formulaic bmP.47  Another 
example of a Class 705 bmP is for “Virtual Sales Personnel.”48  This bmP grants exclusive rights 
to “[S]oftware capable of assisting a computer user to complete an on-line sales transaction in a 
substantially similar manner as a human sales representative over the internet.”49  The claims 
provide exclusive rights for a method to assist customers in the same way that a human sales 
representative would be required to do in real life, but now is applied over the internet via 
software.  This can easily be viewed as very close to an abstract idea that is required to compete 
via the internet, since it seeks to preclude a method describing how a salesman would act over 
any medium.  Another example of a formulaic bmP claims a method for restructuring debt on 
property by manipulating third party transactions.
50
  Generally, the patent claims a BM where a 
third party purchases indebted property, satisfies the debt, and resells the property to the debtor 
for a premium so the debtor can own the property free and clear of any personal debt. The claims 
actually describe the required math formulas of each step.
51
  Most of the claims also cover the 
mental steps required to implement the BM.  This bmP claims the exclusive rights over a 
common real estate practice of “flipping” homes.  This is likely invalid as an abstract idea 
because if this is a valid patent, no real estate agent could use this BM for flipping indebted 
property through purchase of a third party.   
The lower courts have held BMs to be a patentable process, but the issue is still open for 
the Supreme Court and Congress.  The Supreme Court held in Bilski that the MOT Test is not 
determinative, which may have inadvertently expanded the category of patentable BMs to 
include those which are more than an “abstract idea.”  Formulaic BMs have been held to be 
patentable because they “transform” numbers, and post-solution use makes them a tangible 
result.  But the fact remains that abstract ideas should never be patentable, even if applied to 
particular markets.  Despite the best efforts of the USPTO, bmPs have been granted for rights 
over abstract ideas, shown by the examples in Part II B.  From a policy standpoint, these bmPs 
are all problematic.  The methods for upselling, positioning pillows for selling mattresses, and 
for “flipping” real estate debt are all prime examples of abstract ideas that should remain in the 
public domain.  Granting exclusive rights to methods required to do business is inappropriate 
from a policy standpoint because it inhibits competition, which should only be permitted in cases 
where there is high valued public disclosure.
 52
  BmPs provide low value disclosure since they 
                                                          
45
 Id. at 7 (“...[I]ncluding, but not limited to: 1[.] determining customer base and demand (operations research and 
market analysis); 2[.] advertising management, cataloging systems, incentive programs, and redeeming coupons and 
3[.] exchanging money and credit for business transactions (credit and loan processing, point of sale systems and 
billing.”). 
46
 See supra, Part II.A. 
47
 See supra, Part II.A.  
48
 U.S. Patent  No. 6,070,149  (issued May 30, 2000). 
49
 Id. at col. 1 l. 1.  
50
 Business Method for Acquisition of Debtor Real-Estate and Restructuring of Debt, U.S. Patent No. 7,213,001 
(filed June 14, 2001) (issued May 1, 2007). 
51
 Id. at col. 11 l. 1. 
52
 See generally JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES §2:11 (2d ed. 2009) 
(discussing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)) (explaining that one policy underlying patent 
law is to encourage inventors to disclose their inventions to the public, and the public benefits when patents expire 
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contain abstract ideas that have been in the public knowledge for a long time.  It is not enough 
that something has value – the underlying policy concerns of patent law must be considered, and 
the public must be given a quid pro quo that is actually worth something in exchange for giving 
an inventor a monopoly.   
III. USPTO Practice, Congressional Consideration, and the Difficulty of Challenging BMPs. 
A. USPTO Practice  
To receive a U.S. Patent an inventor must apply to the USPTO, the official regulatory 
agency of the patent system.  A patent application is “prosecuted” by USPTO employees known 
as “examiners” to determine if the invention meets patentability requirements.  Since the State 
Street decision, the USPTO has seen an increase in the number of bmP applications,
 53
 but the 
initial ten years are miniscule compared to the recent explosion of bmP applications in the past 
two years.  The question that immediately comes to mind is whether or not the USPTO has 
enough human resources to meet demand and simultaneously devote enough time to properly 
scrutinize each application.  
Recent statistics indicate that Class 705 bmP applications have been issued patents at an 
alarmingly increased rate.  As of 2010, the year of the Bilski decision, the USPTO received at 
least 17,231 Class 705 filings,
54
 and 5,263 patents were issued.
 55
  Assuming that applications 
filed in 2010 were also granted in 2010, approximately 30% of applicants were granted patents.  
However the USPTO examination process usually takes two and a half to three years from filing 
to issuance,
56
 so by comparing the 14,257 Class 705 filings in 2008
57
 to the number of successful 
patent grants in 2010, around 37% of applicants were granted patents from that year.
58
  In 2011, 
the application and issuance rate continued to be similar as the year before.
59
  From 2002 until 
2009, the USPTO on average granted 8.5% of patent applications.
60
  When the patent issuance 
rates in 2010
61
 are compared to the previous eight years, issuance rates have nearly quadrupled.  
The evidence permits two inferred conclusions.  First, in the past two years, the rate of 
granting patents for bmP applications has increased.  Second, the total bmP applications, 
specifically in Class 705, has also increased substantially.  It becomes apparent that the USPTO 
has a formidable task in dealing with an increased workload in coming years.  But has the 
increased rate of issuing bmPs been the result of the USPTO’s increased resource allocation for 
prosecution?  Admittedly, the USPTO has responded well by specifically allocating additional 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
by having free access to the information. But in comparison, there is a competing policy where inventions that are 
already in the public domain must be left in the public domain for all to use). 
53
 See USPTO WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 4 (but also noting that Class 705 applications still made up less than 
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resources for examining BMs and Class 705 applications.
62
  However, this has not been enough 
since there is still huge backlog for patent applications in the USPTO.  As of 2011, the USPTO 
had an average first action pendency of 2 and 1/3 years, and a patent can be pending for nearly 3 
years before it is issued.
63
  This means that it took an examiner nearly 2 and 1/3 years to have a 
first look at an application for a patent as of 2011.  Since a patent expires 20 years after its 
earliest U.S. filing date, every day that patent application awaits a USPTO determination 
imposes costs on the inventor.
64
  It is true that bmPs make up a small percentage of the total 
patents granted each year, so BM applications likely haven’t been the proximate cause of this 
delay.
65
  But at a minimum, they are one contributing cause.  However, it is also readily apparent 
that the USPTO has a huge task in sorting through hundreds of thousands of patent applications 
which has resulted in a long delay for the patent prosecution of other applications.  
An inherent danger within USPTO practice is based on the fact that applicants generally 
claim broadly and leave it up to the patent examiner to require an narrowing amendments.  The 
broadest claims are worth the most, since the claims define the right to exclude.
66
  Inventors do 
not want to narrow their BM to a particular application because broader claims might encompass 
future unknown uses based on the doctrine of equivalents.
67
  A patent examiner must use “prior 
art” to evaluate applications.  Generally speaking, prior art consists of anything that was publicly 
used or known, and other patent applications or patents.
68
  BMs impose several difficulties for 
the examiner while evaluating prior art.  A USPTO Examiner must rebut a presumption that 
every patent application is novel, and a patent will issue when the examiner cannot rebut this 
presumption.
69
  Most, if not all, of information that a patent examiner could use as prior art is 
probably unavailable because BMs are often used secretly, and might not even be written down 
at all, or in one comprehensive work.
70
  This leaves the information unavailable to an examiner 
who must now rely on the limited information presented in other applications, granted patents 
and any cited references.  The USPTO has addressed the issue head on by increasing the 
amounts of non-patent literature on general industry practices.
71
  But this does not change the 
fact that many BMs should be barred from patentability because they have already been publicly 
used.
72
  The “secret” use of a method is really a public yet non-informing use when the results of 
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the method are commercially sold to the public more than one year before patenting, and patent 
case law holds that this type of use creates a novelty bar if done by the patent applicant.
73
  But 
many BMs have been used by other competitors, yet in this secret manner.  It is unlikely that 
examiners could find enough information on these sorts of methods to deny a BM for lack of 
novelty.   
One hypothetical cause of the increased application and issuance rate could be the use of 
a lower Bilski abstract idea standard in examination.
74
  The USPTO has continued to utilize 
factors based on the MOT Test, and has used an abstract idea inquiry as merely a secondary 
measure.
75
  Since Bilski, the USPTO’s examination of bmP applications has not changed much, 
if at all.
76
  Assuming the accuracy of the statements by the Deputy Commissioner in the Interim 
Bilski Guidance, the USPTO has been utilizing the same rules that issued the same controversial 
bmPs that have been discussed.
77
  And when looking at recently issued bmPs, many seem to be 
the application of an abstract idea to new markets or new technologies, which Bilski precisely 
instructs against.
78
  These are impermissible or are likely invalid as abstract ideas.  However, the 
fact that the USPTO examination process utilizes the same standards as pre-Bilski cannot 
conclusively be the cause of the increased application and issuance rates for bmPs.  If BMs have 
received additional funding for research and development directed towards innovation of new 
and useful BMs, then the true goal of patent law might have been realized.  But these questions 
remain to be answered, and a modern in depth empirical study is warranted here. 
B. Congressional Consideration:  
Another major concern lies in the fact that Congress has not paid enough attention to the 
policy rationale underlying patent law to determine the patentability of BMs, as is shown by 
recent Congressional action.  The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act recently amended the 
Patent Act, but the amendments did not affect the statutory nor judicial definition of BMs.
79
  So 
the current trend of issuing broad bmPs will continue until there is precise action.  However, 
Congress has provided a limited defense to infringement suits where the alleged infringer has 
used a BM in U.S. commerce for at least 1 year before the inventor had either filed a patent 
application or made a public disclosure.
80
  This permits businesses to continue using BMs in 
commerce, but it does not address concerns of an alleged infringer who uses a BM within one 
year or less of the inventor’s filing date, which might be the case in rapidly advancing field of 
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BMs.
81
  Importantly, the Leahy-Smith Act does not address the policy issues pertaining to bmPs.  
Congress has also addressed bmPs by adding a new post-patent-issuance USPTO administrative 
proceeding.
82
 
C. Challenging Business Method Patents:  
 So, if a bmP should be invalidated because it is an abstract idea, wouldn’t it be easy to 
challenge and invalidate the patent?  An issued patent is presumed valid, so the burden of 
producing evidence and the burden of proof is on the person challenging the validity of a 
patent.
83
  The parties can negotiate a license agreement, but both parties could be subject to 
litigation costs if they cannot agree on its terms.  The danger here is that a bmP which should be 
invalid might never be invalidated, yet the bmP holder could still unjustifiably reap the rewards 
from patent in the market.
84
 
Challenging the validity of an issued bmP in court is costly. It has been estimated that the 
average patent infringement suit had a median cost of $2.5 million from beginning to end, or 
$1.25 million from just commencing the suit to the end of discovery.
85
  Even for the low end of 
infringement suits, where damages were less than $1 million, the median estimate of total legal 
costs was between $350,000 and $600,000.
86
   These high costs encourage settlement and license 
agreements before bringing suit, so the validity of many bmPs may still not be challenged in 
court, and potentially invalid bmPs would remain enforceable against other parties.  
As of Sept. 2012, validity challengers can utilize a new post-grant review in the USPTO. 
This inter-partes proceeding permits the avoidance of high litigation costs, but standing is limited 
to those accused of patent infringement.
87
  This is problematic because a party only has standing 
to challenge validity after they actually use the bmP.  At that point, it is likely that the accused 
infringer has invested considerable time and resources implementing the bmP.  So the alleged 
infringer now faces a difficult decision.  Does he continue using the bmP, which would drive up 
potential damages for infringement against him, or does stop his business and challenge validity 
in court?  Of course, the accused could probably seek a license to use the bmP, but at this point 
his bargaining power is naught and is at the mercy of the bmP owner because he is already 
infringing.
88
  As noted before, this new proceeding has the potential to reduce litigation costs 
associated with challenging bmPs by avoiding court.  But the new proceeding might not do 
enough.  First, a challenger/infringer will still have to pay for the costs of discovery. Second, the 
mere issuance of a bmP can lead to anti competitive effects on its own.
89
   
It seems that an issued bmP is not easily invalidated, because challengers have a high 
evidentiary burden to meet and likely face very high costs of discovery.  Discovery costs 
themselves could prevent alleged infringers from utilizing the new USPTO inter-partes 
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proceeding, essentially forcing an infringing party into a license that has either an unreasonable 
fee or should not be required because the bmP might be invalid.  
Part III shows that the overall number of applications for bmPs has increased, yet 
government action to address the issue of the patentability of BMs has been moderate.  In the 
past two years, bmPs have a favorable 30% rate of issuance, as compared to a meager 8.5% from 
2002 to 2009.  The USPTO has increased the expertise of its examiners and the resources 
available for the prosecution of bmP applications, yet has been issuing unprecedented numbers 
of bmPs in the past two years at an alarmingly high rate.  There are already inherent dangers in 
the patent system itself which remain unresolved.  Applicants generally claim broadly, so patent 
examiners must thoroughly examine prior art to determine the novelty of the invention.  But a lot 
of prior art that examiners need to make novelty decisions is very difficult to find which 
precludes a comprehensive novelty determination.  BMs are public yet non-informing uses, 
because the results of a BM are commercially sold, yet no one can tell the exact BM that was 
utilized to achieve the end commercial results.  The USPTO has not changed its examination 
procedure after Bilski because abstract ideas have never been patentable.  So the same standards 
that have been applied to grant bmPs for the impermissible examples discussed in Part II B are 
still at work behind the scenes in the USPTO.  Congress has sought to address bmP issues by 
providing new inter-partes proceedings to challenge a presumed valid bmP.  This can lower the 
costs of going to court, but the costs of discovery still remain.  Standing requires an alleged 
infringer to already implement an entire commercial strategy and use the BM before they can 
challenge validity, which can destroy their negotiation power while seeking a licensing 
agreement.  And finally, by side-stepping the issue, Congress has not sufficiently addressed the 
concerns of this paper, i.e. whether or not BMs should be patentable subject matter at all based 
on policy concerns. 
IV. Policy Analysis:   
There are many views on the policy rationale underlying patent law
90
 which are relevant 
to the study of bmPs.  Whether BMs are justified from a policy standpoint is still up for debate.  
From a patent as incentive policy perspective, a patent functions as an incentive to promote 
inventive activity, and society benefits from increased innovation.
91
  Since an inventor can assign 
or license his patent rights to another,
92
 he or she can collect royalties or fees in exchange for use 
of the invention.  This incentive is important where there are high investment costs and where 
the invention can easily be copied once brought to market.  The free-rider policy theory argues 
that without patents, “free-riders” would destroy the incentive to innovate because free-riders 
copy inventions without incurring their own startup costs.
 93
  The patent’s function as incentive is 
also important when there are few substitute market based incentives.  The costs imposed on 
society by recognizing bmP rights are also evaluated.  
Patents incentivize innovation because an inventor receives the opportunity to recoup 
research costs and make a profit by excluding others from the invention.  The patent as incentive 
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function is particularly important and strongly justified in industries with high research and 
development costs and/or when the nature of the invention cannot be kept secret once brought to 
market.
94
  For example, the development of a useful pharmaceutical drug requires huge initial 
research costs, often millions of dollars and years of clinical testing, to create the correct 
chemical composition.
95
  Comparatively, the justification for a patent incentive is weakest when 
the cost of innovation is low.  Innovating BMs does not require direct investment costs, and are 
miniscule compared to other patentable categories.  This is due to the fact that the creation of 
BMs flows naturally from normal business operations, resulting from either experience or from 
self-improvement of organizational aspects.  For example, Class 705 BMs pertain to general 
business operations, market analysis, and advertising management, all which are required to 
compete in the marketplace.
96
  The costs of developing BMs arise from the cost of doing 
business on a day to day basis, and thus are indirect.  The highest investment costs of any 
invention occur during the research and development phase.  For example, physical inventions 
usually require construction of prototypes.  Drugs require clinical tests.  BMs do not require the 
construction of prototypes because one cannot physically make a method.  However, software 
implemented BMs most likely require the most significant startup costs as compared to all other 
BMs.
97
  But even those costs are negligible as compared to other patentable subject matter, 
because it most often only requires the costs of labor to employ software programmers.  The 
justification for providing a patent incentive is weakened for BMs because they do not require a 
large level of direct investment costs.  
The free-rider theory is closely related to the second prong of the patent incentive theory, 
which argues that patent incentives are strongly justified when inventions are easily copied.  If 
inventions are easily copied, free-riders would destroy any market based incentives to innovate.  
By copying inventions, free-riders do not incur the research and development costs, and could 
offer the copy at lower prices, thus forcing innovators out of the market.  If this were the case, 
investments in innovation would diminish because inventors would not have an adequate 
opportunity to recoup costs.  Thus, society would suffer due to a lack of innovation without the 
patent system’s incentive.98  Returning to the analogy of the pharmaceutical drug industry, once 
a drug is sold, a competitor could easily reverse engineer and create their own cheaper generic 
version.  Without patent protection, pharmaceutical drug creators would not have sufficient 
incentives to develop new drugs because they would be ousted from the market as soon as their 
drug hit the market.
99
  But the free-rider justification for patents is strong when the value of the 
invention can be discovered by simply observing the invention’s public use and figuring out 
what makes an invention tick, as in the pharmaceutical industry.  Comparatively, BMs are a 
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hybrid form of public, yet non-informing, use which directly negates the free-rider rationale for 
patent protection.  BMs are used publicly in that the public sees the end result of the method.  
But the public cannot decipher the actual steps operating behind the scenes, which makes the use 
of BMs non-informing even when done in public.  It is difficult to decipher a method from 
seeing the end result alone, thus free-riders aren’t very threatening to the currently existing 
market based incentives for BMs.  True, free-riders could theoretically reverse engineer BMs, 
but while doing so the free-rider would be required to incur their own research and development 
costs.  This might reduce the reprehensibility of a free-rider as well.
100
  In the context of software 
bmPs, software is not readily available to the public without physical access to the computer 
containing it.  Software code is generally stored on password restricted servers, not on websites, 
so there is little threat of losing software to random public users viewing web pages.  
Additionally, Federal Law protects the unauthorized access of certain computers used by 
financial institutions.
101
  If software is distributed by the bmP owner, a BM can be protected by 
state contract law by utilizing well drafted end user license agreements, a common practice for 
protecting rights to software.
102
  Additionally, BMs do not implicate free riding as much as other 
patentable subject categories because their true value lies in the organization’s ability to execute 
it, not necessarily in the steps of the method itself.  So even if a BM were easy to copy, in many 
cases it is not enough to simply copy it.
103
  This is true because most BMs in Class 705 pertain to 
structural and organizational components of the business.
104
  
The patent as incentive theory takes on greater significance when there are few substitute 
incentives in a free market, because then patents become the primary incentive for innovative 
activity.  In contrast, if a patent-less market provides adequate incentives to innovate, there is 
less justification for the adding a patent incentive.
105
  In the context of BMs, the marketplace 
contains a multitude of incentives which are much more significant than a patent incentive 
because they are potentially much more profitable.  This diminishes the necessity for a patent 
incentive because the marketplace offers an adequate recoupment opportunity to encourage the 
continued production of useful BMs.  Since bmPs serve mainly commercial functions, BMs are 
always created to capture a market based incentive of either reducing transaction costs or 
increasing productivity levels.
106
  Every business must achieve sustainable competitive 
advantages over competitors to maintain profitability in the marketplace.  For example, a 
business method that saves transaction costs will allow the business to supply goods or services 
at a lower cost than competitors, which may draw more customers.  Or businesses can maintain 
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the normal market price and reap higher profits with the current customer base.  First mover 
advantages allow organizations to capture the first audience of a market niche.  “Sticky effects” 
are associated with first movers, describing the notion that consumers often equate the first with 
the best, at least for a short time.
107
 
BmPs impose societal costs by producing anti-competitive effects that exist outside the 
scope of the patent rights.  These unintended consequences are a huge cost because it could 
potentially reduce innovation in the field or create an extensive cross licensing patent thicket 
which increases the costs of doing business.
108
  From the outset, a BMP can be the foundation for 
creating “network effects” where a BMP holder can create comprehensive systems based on one 
central bmP to attract consumers.
109
  The network’s worth is based on the size of the network 
itself because consumers are attracted to large networks.
110
  BmPs permit the owner to create 
large networks without competition.  But once a BMP owner creates a large network of its own 
and attracts many customers, the validity of the BMP becomes almost irrelevant later, because 
often customers will stick with them.
111
 
Another cost to society occurs when bmP owners make inefficient use of the court 
system.  Courts often will be forced to adjudicate what are essentially negotiation failures.  BmP 
owners have the upper hand in negotiations with a potential licensee.  Typically when licensing 
negotiations fail, the parties can settle and negotiate or choose not to deal with each other.  But if 
an impasse is reached in negotiations where one party owns a bmP, the bmP owner would 
probably seek an injunction precluding the other side from competing.  This is one bargaining 
chip that might force potential licensees to accept unfavorable terms during negotiations who 
would otherwise walk away from a bad business deal.  What is more disturbing is that a bmP 
holder can unilaterally demand a higher licensing premium than it should receive in an open 
market and the licensee might have no choice but to accept.  For instance, if a licensee models 
their business around a licensed bmP, their business might become dependent on their ability to 
use the bmP.  If a bmP owner terminates the agreement, the licensee’s entire business could be 
crippled.  Successful firms might ironically be subject to exorbitant licensing fees from the 
smaller bmP holder who has not been as successful, thus increasing the costs for consumers to 
use the “best” services out there.  Additionally, even if a bmP owner wins an infringement suit, 
the remedies available might be insufficient to protect their rights.   
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. exemplifies all of the above concerns.
112
  
MercExchange refused to continue a bmP licensing agreement with eBay because they were not 
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satisfied with the renewed offer since eBay had recently enjoyed a huge boom in its business.
113
  
So when negotiation for a renewed license failed, MercExchange sought to enjoin eBay from 
continuing to use the bmP.  The bmP owned by MercExchange was for a software implemented 
method of an on-line sales program which eBay had previously licensed.  Since eBay had 
already built its online auction business around MercExchange’s bmP, it would have to cease its 
entire business to stop infringing. EBay was practically left with no choice but to willfully 
infringe and challenge the validity of the patent in court.   
The case is important because the Supreme Court ruled injunctions are not automatically 
granted, even if one party has willfully infringed a patent, as occurred here.
114
  BmP holders still 
have to make a showing of irreparable harm, which will be very difficult in cases where they 
initially license to one party but continue to offer third parties similar licensing arrangements.
115
  
Second, MercExchange’s decision to go to court resulted from a negotiation failure which had 
essentially forced eBay to infringe the bmP.  It is easy to say that courts should not get involved 
in these types of disputes – negotiations are better left to the bargaining table and the free market.  
Finally, cases such as these are not a good use of scarce judicial resources.  11 different decisions 
were made on this issue over the span of 8 years.
116
  Combined with the fact that every 
injunction sought must now be litigated, the costs to society by granting bmPs are great in that it 
ties up the judicial system which already is a scarcely limited resource.   
Since BMs do not require high direct investment costs, a patent incentive to create BMs 
is generally not urgent. BMs often flow naturally as a result of experience or from a general 
organizational desire to achieve better business functions.  Direct innovation costs are probably 
limited to the costs of labor, and even that could be considered a part of overhead costs of daily 
operations.  Additionally, since bmPs are created to satisfy financial and managerial needs, their 
adequate target is recouping market based incentives, such as first-mover advantages and 
achieving lower transaction costs.  Since BMs are publicly used, yet non-informing as to the 
method in operation behind the scenes, free-riders will not be able to easily reverse engineer the 
methods.  Additionally, software is protected from misappropriation by other state and federal 
laws.  The value of BMs is within the organizational effectiveness of implementing the method, 
not in the method itself.  BmPs create huge costs to society by forcing what are essentially 
negotiation failures into the court system, as exemplified by the eBay v. MercExchange decision. 
Analyzing the policy of patent law yields at least one conclusion: expanding BMs as a patentable 
category is highly questionable from a policy perspective.   
V. CONCLUSION:  
BMs have been recognized as patentable since the State Street decision.  A BM is a 
method which serves primarily commercial functions, or a market-based strategy.  They 
generally seek to achieve two commercial goals - decreased transaction costs and increasing 
productivity.  The USPTO denotes Class 705 as the classification for bmPs, which generally 
consist of organizational business methods, marketing methods, methods for analyzing customer 
bases, and financial data analysis methods.  The court rules are ambiguous because there are no 
bright line rules.  Abstract ideas include laws of nature, natural phenomena and mathematical 
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Id. at  392 (citing MercExch., L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
115
 Id. at 392.  
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formulas.  An abstract idea is at least method which embodies general economic principles or 
common methods of doing business.  Applying an abstract idea to a specific industry cannot 
render it patentable.  Abstract ideas can never be patented because these are too close to the 
inventive ideas required to innovate and create subsequent inventions.  These must remain in the 
public domain for use by all inventors.  The expansion of patent to include BMs is troubling 
because the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, but recently noted that they are of 
suspect validity.  An in depth policy analysis is required, combined with some empirical 
research. 
BMs are generally of questionable validity because many examples of currently issued 
bmPs are likely an abstract idea and invalid.  The examples show that some current bmPs cover 
abstract ideas, taking ideas and the basic methods of doing business out of the public domain into 
the hands of a private person.  If the USPTO continues to use its current standards, there is a 
chance that abstract ideas will continue to be patented.  Recent USPTO statistics indicate that 
around 30% of applications are granted patents, and the number of applications has been 
increasing, so if the USPTO does not change its prosecution methods, there is a chance to have a 
butterfly effect on the rest of the patent system for at least the next decade.  Although the 
USPTO has responded valiantly in an attempt to deal with the demands of the patent system, it 
probably has not been enough.  Patent examiners must still determine what an abstract idea is, 
and it is a concept which cannot be specifically defined.  The USPTO has not substantially 
changed its examination procedure for BMs since the State Street decision.  Additionally, the 
patent system presumes novelty for all patent applications so an examiner must do extensive 
research to rebut the novelty presumption.  Thus it is possible that bmPs which are invalid or of 
questionable validity may continue to be issued.  
Congress has also responded, but the current remedies available to infringers are not 
enough.  The post-issuance inter-partes USPTO proceeding does not alleviate high discovery 
costs, and since a patent is presumed valid the challenger still faces a daunting task, even if it is 
in front of the USPTO. 
Expanding patent protection over BMs is highly questionable from a policy standpoint.  
Whenever patent rights are enlarged, it is not enough that the thing has value – a thorough policy 
determination must show the inventive activity warrants a public monopoly.  The ultimate goal 
of patent law is to stimulate innovation and invention by providing the patent right to exclude.  
But since BMs do not require high direct investment costs, there is a little need for an additional 
patent incentive to foster their innovation.  Low investment requirements also supports the idea 
that market based incentives are more than adequate as an incentive than patents.  Recognizing n 
exclusive patent right blocks most of these market based incentives to nearly all competitors that 
do not have a patent, by precluding competition and promoting anti-competitive effects outside 
of the patent itself.  Also, BMs are not easy to free-ride upon because they are publicly used yet 
non-informing and the true value of a BM lies in the application of the method, not necessarily 
the exclusive right to the method.   
The subject matter requirement should perform a gatekeeper role for BMs.  There are two 
proposed options.  The first broader recommendation is that BMs should be categorically 
excluded from patentability.  First, there is a low, if any, need to provide a patent incentive for 
BMs.  Additionally, the costs which society incurs as a direct result of granting bmPs are far 
greater than the benefits society receives from BMs.  The costs include a high risk for granting 
patents on public domain knowledge, an inefficient use of the court system when bmP license 
negotiations fail, and even precluding competition through fostering certain unintended anti-
18 
competitive effects.  It seems as if the costs to society outweigh the benefits of granting bmPs.  
However, in light of the extensive case precedent and Congressional inaction, this is the less 
likely option.  The second narrower recommendation is to apply a rebuttable presumption that 
Business Methods are not a patentable subject category and are not novel, unless the patent 
applicant can prove the contrary by a preponderance of the evidence in the USPTO during 
prosecution.  
 
